The Brooch, the Blind Spot, and CARICOM’s Strategic Reckoning

By Prof C. Justin Robinson, Pro Vice Chancellor and Campus Principal, UWI, Five Islands Campus

A brooch is not a weapon of war. But in diplomacy, symbols are never just symbols. They condense meaning, test boundaries, and reveal who is willing to look away. Brooch diplomacy is not entirely new.  A friend reminded me that Madeline Albright (former US Foreign Secretary) wore a snake pin when meeting with Iraqi officials after Saddam Hussein’s poet-in-residence described her as an “unparalleled serpent”. Vladimir Putin is reputed to have confined to Bill Clinton that Russian diplomats routinely checked to see which brooch Albright decided to wear.

When Venezuela’s acting president, Delcy Rodríguez, appeared at official engagements wearing a brooch that depicted the Essequibo region as Venezuelan territory, she committed a small but precise act of political theatre. That it happened on Caribbean soil, in the presence of CARICOM leaders, and while the Guyana–Venezuela border controversy remains before the International Court of Justice, turned a piece of jewellery into a statement of state policy. Guyana was right to object and CARICOM was right to insist that its platforms must not be used to legitimize claims under active judicial review.

Yet the incident raises a difficult question, why did CARICOM need such a visible provocation to reaffirm a principle that should have been automatic?

The brooch exposed a tendency in the region’s handling of Caracas that is best described as strategic optimism, the belief that historical ties, energy diplomacy, and the soft language of fraternity would be sufficient to restrain hard geopolitical interests, they are not. Venezuela can be a friend to the Caribbean in one context and seek to pursue territorial claims related to Guyana in another. In international relations, these are not contradictions, they are strategic choices.

That is precisely why CARICOM’s position must now be clear, disciplined, and unembarrassed. We stand with Guyana, Essequibo is not a bargaining chip, it is not a decorative assertion on a visiting leader’s jacket. It is Guyanese territory under Guyanese administration, and the matter is properly before the ICJ. No member state should allow its official platforms, photo lines, or bilateral engagements to blur that line.

But standing with Guyana does not require us to pretend that Venezuela has meant nothing to the Caribbean. That would be dishonest and strategically unwise. Through PetroCaribe, launched by Hugo Chávez in 2005, Venezuela offered what no other oil power was prepared to provide. Crude oil on concessional terms, with 25year repayment periods at one percent interest. For many small island states, that created fiscal breathing room, cushioned oil shocks, and financed development. It was also, let us be mature enough to admit, a form of influence, diplomacy through barrels, not pure benevolence. Still, Venezuela treated the Caribbean with a seriousness that larger powers often reserved for speeches. That fact lingers in regional memory, Venezuela is our neighbour, it has been good to the region and remains strategically important.

And that is why this moment is so delicate. CARICOM must not become antiVenezuela. But neither can it afford to remain naïve about Venezuela. Gratitude cannot become silence and energy security cannot become territorial ambiguity. Friendship cannot require us to look away when a member state’s sovereignty is publicly challenged.

This brings us to the oldest dilemma of smallstate foreign policy, how to balance immediate security concerns against the risks of overreliance on any single external partner. The Caribbean has, at various moments, sought security cooperation with larger powers, legitimately so, given the transnational challenges of crime, migration, and maritime threats. But small states must be careful when they attach their strategic posture to the ambitions of a great power. The United States may seek to remove one leader and later decide to work with his deputy. It may threaten regime change and then settle for continuity. It may encourage regional allies to take certain positions, then pivot to another theatre. Washington’s priorities shift, the Caribbean’s geography does not.

That is not an argument for cowardice. It is an argument for strategic realism and for what regional diplomats have long called “keeping options open.” The Caribbean has survived great power rivalries before by diversifying its friendships and refusing to be a battlefield for others’ ambitions. That instinct deserves renewed attention.

If the United States becomes distracted by a Pacific crisis, a European war, or a domestic succession and decides that its interests are satisfied by oil access and minimal cooperation from Caracas, Caribbean states could find themselves facing a resentful Venezuela with far less American attention than they anticipated. That possibility is not a prediction, it is a reminder that geography is permanent and alliances are not.

CARICOM’s task is not to choose between Washington and Caracas as though the region were a trophy in someone else’s contest. Its task is to defend Caribbean sovereignty, preserve the Caribbean as a zone of peace, and ensure that no member state is isolated when its territorial integrity is challenged. That means supporting Guyana without turning every bridge to Venezuela into a battlefield. It means engaging Caracas without allowing it to redraw Guyana’s map in our presence.

The brooch was wrong but it was also useful. It reminded us that diplomacy is not only what is signed in communiqués. It is also what is displayed, normalized, photographed, tolerated, and left unchallenged.

CARICOM should now adopt a simple protocol: no official regional engagement shall be used to display symbols, maps, pins, flags, or language asserting a territorial claim against a CARICOM member while that matter is before an international court. That is not hostility, that is discipline.

We can remember PetroCaribe and still defend Guyana. We can value Venezuela and still reject provocation. We can cooperate with extraregional partners and still refuse to outsource our judgment.

The Caribbean has long survived by being diplomatic. But diplomacy without clarity is not wisdom, it is caution without conviction.

The brooch showed us that. Now CARICOM must show that it has learned.